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Abstract 
Despite thirty years of study by the academic community, industry has not em- 
braced the systematic usage of formal methods. To address this concern, a formal 
method is proposed which possesses many of the qualities that  practitioners have 
listed as lacking from current formal methods: inclusion of both a specification and 
verification model, a tabular notation that  only requires knowledge of first-order 
logic, support for both composition and decomposition, application throughout the 
software life-cycle, and tool support. The presentation includes several applications 
to safety-critical software systems. 
Keywords and Phrases Formal methods, specification, trace-based sys- 
tems, software development, concurrency, verification. 
1. Introduction 
Despite thirty years of study in the academic community, formal specifica- 
tion and verification models of software systems have been slow in making a large 
impact on industrial software development. Of the instances of applying formal 
methods during large-scale software development, most of these systems have in- 
volved safety-critical applications [1,7,9,17,18,23]. The safety-critical environment 
was a natural candidate because of the generally accepted advantages of applying 
forrnal method analysis: increased assurance of reliability, predictibility of sys- 
tem behavior, and the ability to identify potential faults and subsequent recovery 
measures. 
Recently, the academic community has focused on why industry hasn't em- 
braced the systematic usage of forrnal methods [4,24,25,30]. Roundtable discus- 
sions from academicians, practitioners, and engineers [25] have identified a number 
of potential causes: inadequate tools, inadequate examples, the mathematics re- 
quired is beyond the standard engineering curriculum, lack of support for the entire 
software life-cycle, scalability, and cost-effectiveness. Some practitioners have felt 
distanced by the academic community due to  the academician's lack of understand- 
ing of the industrial problem domain which may, in part, explain why a majority 
of formalisms aren't readily or directly applicable t o  industrial problems. This 
distancing can be so extreme that  some practitioners encourage the avoidance of 
methods that  are overloaded with formalisms [30]. 
Having identified the qualities that  are lacking from most forrnal methods, aca- 
demicians should now focus on creating formal methods with qualities that  industry 
both needs and desires. Namely, a method that 
1. Has a mathematical foundation 
2. Abstracts the state of a system to  a level that neither leads to 
omission nor biases an implementation 
3. Supports composition 
4. Isolates failures 
5. Supports modularity 
6. Allows developers to use more formal techniques in the 
specification and design phases, support refinement to 
executable code, and proof-of properties 
7. Is applicable to  the industrial problem domain 
8. Has tool support 
9. Is easily used by engineers 
In this paper, a formal method is proposed which meets all t,he characteristics 
and qualities outlined above. It is based upon t,he modular verification model de- 
fined in [26] t o  determine the externally visible behavior of concurrent systems. The 
majority of the presentation centers on the introduction of a corresponding speci- 
fication model which is also modular and fully abstract. The specification model 
was also influenced by the engineering notations used in the variety of specifica- 
tion requirements documents created by NASA contractors for the International 
Space Station Alpha. The combination of the specification and verification rriodels 
comprise a formal method that can be applied throughout the software life-cycle, 
has been used in industrial software development, and appeals to engineers due 
to  its operational nature. The tool PVS [19] can be used to  predict behavior and 
establish proof-of properties of these specifications. The specification model is easy 
to teach as it is currently taught a t  the undergraduate level and is used in other 
core curriculum courses of a software engineering undergraduate degree. 
The method used to  specify a concurrent program is presented in section 11. 
Examples of the application of this specification model t o  the Alternating Bit 
Protocol, Byzantine Agreement, and a safety-critical application are elaborated in 
section 111. The integration of the proposed formal method into the software life- 
cycle is outlined in sect,ion IV and ilicludes an example of refinement into executable 
code of the Alternating Bit Protocol. A comparison t o  related works is made in 
section V. 
2. Specification Model 
The use of a formal specification notation to outline the functional character- 
istics of the intended behavior of a concurrent program allows the programmer t o  
be concise and unambiguous. Specifications also aid in understanding the complex 
interactions between processes and provide a basis for the verification of the result- 
ing program. When producing specifications, it is important to avoid biasing the 
choice of implementation by including details which suggest or imply a particular 
implementation strategy. I t  is also desirable t o  use the same formalism to spec- 
ify the characteristics of the system components created by gradually refining the 
high-level specification of the concurrent program into individual process specifi- 
cations. Clearly, a formal specification model that  provides the ability to  express 
high-level modular specifications without implementation details and that  supports 
hierarchical system decomposition will aid in the creation and comprehension of 
concurrent programs. 
A process is specified as the collection of specifications of t,he externally visible 
"actions" of the process which will constitute its externally visible behavior. An 
action represents an interaction between this process and the other processes of 
the concurrent program. The specification of an action describes when that  act,ion 
may occur in terms of the current value of the process trace and the effect of the 
occurrence of this action on the process trace by the addition of another element 
to the sequence. The externally visible behavior of a process does not reference 
any internal state changes nor does it permit assumptions concerning the behavior 
of the other processes in the program. 
A concurrent program is specified as the collection of specifications of the ex- 
ternally visible actions of the program. The set of externally visible actions of the 
processes that  constitute the concurrent program is larger than the set of exter- 
nally visible actions of the program itself. This fact is due to individual process 
actions caused by internal program interactions exclude them from membership in 
the set of externally visible actions of the program. It is important t o  note that  
this model of specifying concurrency is independent of any particular concurrent 
programming language. 
The specification of the externally visible behavior of each concurrent program 
captures the global behavior of that  program without the need to examine the 
internal structure of the individual processes. Therefore, our specifications will not 
bias toward a particular implementation nor a particular concurrent programming 
language. They are also written a t  an appropriate level of abstraction since they 
capture the intended behavior of a concurrent program in sufficient detail to verify 
its correctness without cluttering the specification with the details of how the pro- 
gram achieves this behavior. Since the specification of a process is defined in terms 
of its externally visible actions without assuming any possible behavior of the other 
processes in the program, our specifications are modular: a modification of the im- 
plementation of any one process would not cause a change in the specifications of 
the other processes in the program. 
2.1 Trace Notation 
The variable h is used to represent the process trace sequence. A subscript, hi, 
is used to  identify the process to  which this trace sequence is associated. Generally, 
process trace sequences are initialized t o  the empty sequence, E. Trace operations 
are defined as follows. 
Notation 
#h 





the length of h 
h' is a prefix of h 
h is concatenated t o  h' 
the reverse of h 
the restriction of the elements of h only 
to those elernents involving process P, 
the restriction of the elements of h only 
to those elernents involving programs 
external to  the program P 
2.2 Process Specifications 
A concurrent program P is a correct implementation of a specification if the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
1. If the execution of P begins in a state satisfying the precondition of p, then the 
execution of P terminates in a state in which the values of the process traces, 
h l ,  . . . , h,, and their initial values satisfy the relation defined by the specification. 
2. If the execution of P begins in a state satisfying the precondition of p and the 
execution of IJ is not expected to  terminate, then the execution of P maintains 
a state invariant in which the values of the process traces, h l ,  . . . , h,, and their 
initial values satisfy the relation defined by the specification. 
3. If the precondition of P is not satisfied by the initial state, then the specification 
does not determine the behavior of p. 
Thus? a specification determines the precondition on the initial state and the rela- 
tionship between the initial and final (or intermediate) state(s) of p. 
Formally, an individual process execution is represented by a sequence of the 
form 
where h: is the prefix of length j of the process trace sequence h, and aI, is an 
element from the set of externally visible actions of the process P,. All possible 
process trace sequences for the process P, defines a "behavioral" model of the 
process. This sequence of externally visible actions of a process was chosen t o  
coincide with the definition of externally observable behavior in [26] which defined 
the modular semantics of concurrent systems. 
Since actions coincide with the observable behavior of a process, they typically 
are some form of communication: (a)synchronous message passing or shared vari- 
able communication. An action is defined in terms of a change of value of the 
corresponding process trace. A specificattion of an action, which includes the cur- 
rent and extended process trace, will be written in two parts: an enabling and an 
eSfect. The effect specifies the change in value of the process trace by concatenat,ing 
another element to t8he trace. The enabling part specifies when this action may 
occur as a guard to  the trace update. 
To write the specification of a process, the actions which comprise the behavior 
of that  process are determined. For each action, all possible enabling conditions 
and their effect on the process trace are listed. Tabular notation is used t o  represent 
the process specification where each table is an appealing visual representation of 
the potential changes of a process trace. Specification tables have the following 
form. 
Pi I action I 
1 enable / effect I 
A sequence element has the form, ( c A , ~ ,  j,lT), where C represents the type of com- 
munication (either input or output), A represents the externally visible action, and 
i names the process to  which this element is associated. If C represents output, then 
a j component is included to name the process that  receives the output. Lastly, Z 
represents the data sent or received. 
The enable condition is typically written in terms of the last element of the 
process trace sequence a t  any point in time, namely h;(l) .  Therefore, an  individual 
element as the enable condition means that  the current last element of the sequence 
is asserted to be of this form. Similarly, the effect lists the element which is added 
to  the process trace sequence for a particular action. To conserve table space, the i 
and j component is omitted from elements when their values are readily apparent. 
Additionally, the action initial will be omitted from the table when the process 
trace sequence is initialized to E.  
The notation, pi sat ti, indicates that  the process trace sequence values satisfy 
the predicate composed of the specification table entries a t  any point during the 
execution of Pi. The predicate ti is constructed as follows: Aj enablej =+ e f f e c t j  
where j ranges over the rows of the table ti. 
2.3 (De) Cornpositionality 
The individual process traces, h,, are combined to determine a co~icur~en t  pro- 
gram trace, h, representing the externally observable behavior of the concurrent 
system consisting of the composition of processes. The combining of the process 
traces must obey compatibility, e.g. if P, sends a particular value t o  P,, then 
this value must be recorded on bot,h sequences in an appropriate location. Essen- 
tially, compatibility (or mutual consistency) ensures that  the set of process trace 
sequences under consideration could arise during the execution of the correspond- 
ing set of processes. In fact, any program trace sequence can be used t o  define 
individual process traces by projecting out and colicatenating each element of h 
which involves that particular process. 
It is this observation which forrns the basis of the rule for composing the in- 
dividual process specifications into a concurrent program specification, where p is 
composed of processes [PI ( 1  . . . IIP,]. 
Pi sat t i? i = l ,  . . . ,  n 
3h. [ [ h,/l = hl A t l  A h/2 = hz tz A . .  . A  h/n = h, A t,] =+ t 1 
P sat t 
The following inference rule can be used t o  weaken the specification, ti. 
Pi sat t i ,  ti 3 t k  
P, sat t k  
This colicurrent program may also be a subsystem of a larger concurrent pro- 
gram. If so, the program trace sequence can be modified to  represent the externally 
7 
visible actions of the program by eliminating all actions involving pairs of processes 
that  are components of this program. The program trace sequence must only con- 
tain actions involving an internal process and a process which is external to  this 
program. 
Program trace sequences can be decomposed into partial process trace se- 
quences. The elements of the original sequences are partitioned and associated 
with individual process traces on the basis of the externally visible actions of a 
process. It is necessary to  preserve the original ordering of the elements in the pro- 
gram trace in the process trace. During the process of iterative refinement stages 
which continually adds implementation details, additional processes will be added 
t,o the concurrent program. Each additional process will have a set of externally 
visible actions which are new to the concurrent program. Those processes which 
inherit externally visible actions from the concurrent program may also increase 
their set of actions with additional externally visible actions involving this process 
and one of the newly created processes. 
P sat t 
Qi E ProcID(h). [ 3hi. [hli = hZxt A ti * ti] 1 
Pi sat ti 
The function, ProcID(h), returns the set of processes identified in the elements 
of the program trace sequence h. The notation ti defines a specification table 
consisting of those actions which are also externally visible actions of the process pi. 
Any references to actions in the remaining enabling conditions which are not shared 
by P and Pi must be eliminated. Finally, we can not assume that  the enabling 
condition as denoted in t refers to  the last element of the process trace sequence, 
hi. However, it does refer to  sorrle prior element; so the enabling condition, el must 
be modified as follows: Max{j : j 5 #hi and h;(j) = e). 
This inference rule ensures that  the order of elements in the program trace 
sequence h is preserved in the individual process trace sequences hi for those ex- 
ternally visible actions shared by both the process Pi and the program P. The rule 
also ensures that  the assertion corresponding to the portion of the specifica,tion 
table t of the shared externally visible actions implies the assertion corresponding 
to the new specification table ti. 
3. Examples 
3.1 Alternating Bit Protocol 
The Alternating Bit Prot,ocol is a classic network protocol [2]. It requires 
only one bit of control information t o  guarantee reliability. The original protocol 
consists of two processes which can send and receive data from outside users and 
a potentially faulty communication medium. To simplify the specification, we will 
only permit process Receive to receive data from users and only permit process 
Send to send data to  users. 
The process Receive accepts data from an external unbounded source of data, 
adds a sequence bit to  the data to create a message, and sends this message to pro- 
cess Send by calling the method Forward. The process Send receives the message, 
strips off the sequence bit, and outputs the data to  an unbounded sink. Acknowl- 
edgments, defined as a sequence bit, are sent back to  the process Receive. The 
communication medium is modeled as single element buffers that  can change a se- 
quence number to the constant '%errorn (any integer other than 0 or I) to represent 
a corruption of the data. The specification of this protocol must demonstrate the 
delivery of the messages in the correct order despite possible corruption by the 
medium. 
1 Send 
{(?Forward,num,info) V (!Write, info)) (!RepIy,s_ack) 
Action 1 
Enable 




The specification of the process Receive includes the datum to  be sent and r-ack 
which is used to  determine the receipt of the acknowledgement from the process 
Send. The specification of the process Send defines info to represent the message 
received and num which is used t o  determine whether info contains an uncorrupted 
new message. 
The specification of the Alternating Bit Protocol must ensure the delivery of 
these messages in the correct order. From examination of the process trace sequence 
hRes for the process Receive, a sequence of data items, F, can be constructed rep- 
resenting all data received from the outside source. Correspondingly, the sequence 
s, containing all data sent to the users, can be constructed from the process trace 
sequence hSend for the process Send. Therefore, the specification for the prot,ocol 
will ensure that  'i: i F for the protocol trace h. 
3.2 Byzantine Agreement 
The Byzantine Agreement problem, first introduced by Pease et a1.1221, illus- 
trates fault tolerance in distributed systems. A system which communicates by 
message passing has two different kinds of processes: reliable and unreliable. If 
there are m (m > 0) unreliable processes, then there must be a t  least 3 * m + 1 reli- 
able processes for a solution to  the Byzantine Agreement problem to exist. There 
is a designated process, called commander, that  may or may not be reliable. Each 
process i has a local variable byz,. Agreement is reached when every reliable process 
sets its local variable, byz,, to  a common value. If the commander process is reliable, 
then this common value is d,, the initial value of the commander's local variable; 
otherwise, the common value is N I L .  Since reliable processes are indistinguishable 
from unreliable ones, it is unltnown a t  the time of receipt whether an  individual 
message is arbit,rary or not. 
The specification of the Byzantine Agreement algorithm states that  
byzi = byzj, where i ,  j are reliable processes 
and 
commander is reliable ==+ byzi = d ,  
The algorithm assumes a function ma.joritywith the property that if a majority 
of the values v, equal d, then majority(v,, . . . , vn-,) equals d,. If no majority value 
among the v, exists, then majority(vl, . . . , vn-1) equals N I L .  For simplicity, we will 
initially assume that  m = 1. The specifications for the colnn~ander and an  arbitrary 
process PC from the n - 1 processes are given. 
Commander Action I 
In the first step, the commander sends a value vi to  all n - 1 processes. If the 
commander is reliable, t,he vi are equal to d,, the value of the commander's local 
variable. If the commander is unreliable, the values of the vi are arbitrary. Once 
the process Pi receives the commander's message, the value received is forwarded 
to the other n - 2 processes. Pi either receives a copy of the value that  each other 
process received from the commander or an arbitrary value. The majority function 
is then used t o  determine the value of byzi. 
Enable 
The complexity of the Byzantine Agreement algorithm grows significantly with 
larger numbers of faulty processes. By just increasing m t o  2, the specification 
table must be duplicated n - I times. 
RecC 
3.3 ISSA Command & Control Example 
I I 
As part of an ongoing project by NASA to  study the effectiveness of formal 
methods in improving the quality of software requirements, formal analysis of the 
software requirements of the Failure, Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) 
system of the  International Space Station -4lpha (ISSA) has been performed [6]. 
This analysis focused on whether the dynamic interactions of the FDIR system 
were both consistent and complete and whether the most catastrophic failures had 
appropriate recovery measures. The difficulty of this analysis is compounded by 
the fact that  multiple subsystems are responsible for identifying, isolating, and 
recovering from just one type of failure. 
The software subsystem, Command & Control (C&C), of ISSA is mainly re- 
sponsible for station level control, command and data handling, and communica- 
tions functions. It is this system which issues the command to perform nonpropul- 
sive a,ttitude maneuvers; a maneuver which is performed as part of the docking of 
the Space Shuttle with ISSA. The ISSA subsystem, Guidance, Navigation and Con- 
trol (GN&C), is responsible for navigation, attitude determination, and attitude 
control. The following diagram illustrates the actions taken by these two subsys- 
tems when an attitude maneuver command is issued and a Caution & Warning 
(e.g. failure) event occurs. 
In the following diagram, nodes represent modular components of either the 
C&C or the GN&C subsystem and the arcs represent a subset of possible actions 
of the two subsystems. 
The tabular specification of the C k C  attitude controller and the GY&C control 






In the diagram, the GN&C control attitude subsystem is composed of four 
separate components: control attitude manager, torque command generator, CMG 
(control moment gyros) control & monitor, and the controller performance monitor. 
To illustrate the cornpositionality of individual component specification tables, the 
separate GN&C component specifications are given. Those actions which involve 
only GN&C control attitude subsystem components are internal t o  this subsystem 
and are not represented in the GN&C CA specification table. 
GN&C CA 
Enable 





4. Application in Software Development 
The requirements specification of a software system is only one phase of the 
software life cycle. First, the specifications are written, analyzed for consistency 
and completeness, and tested. The specifications are then refined by iterative 
design stages into an implementation in a particular programming language. Next, 
the implementation is verified and processes are tested independently. Processes 
are combined into independent modules and tested. Modules are integrated into a 
system, which is tested and validated. Finally, the system is maintained. 
The proposed formal method is all encompassing in that  it can be  applied t o  any 
phase of the software life cycle. This formal method contains a specification model 
that  is both modular and compositional. A specification model possessing these 
characteristics supports the development process by driving the creation of smaller, 
disjoint system components of the concurrent program. One of the most important 
issues concerning specifications is the assurance that a particular implementation 
satisfies it,s specification. The verification model included in t,he proposed formal 
method provides this assurance by establishing either a postcondition or invariant 
of the implementation which can be shown to imply the specification. 
The productivity of the development process is improved by locating errors a t  
the earliest moment; ideally, when creating and analyzing the specification but cer- 
tainly when ensuring that  a particular implementation satisfies a specification. The 
specifications can be analyzed using the tool PVS [19] and the tabular specification 
notation is a natural origin for test case generation. Lastly, the maintainability of 
the system is simplified by providing a formal statement of the individual system 
component's behavior. 
To demonstrate the applicability of the formal method t o  other phases of the 
software life cycle, an  example of establishing that  an implementation satisfies its 
specification follows. 
3.1 Refinement of the Alternating Bit Protocol 
The implementation language chosen for the Alternating Bit Protocal is Java 
which supports thread synchronization through the use of monitors. In general, a 
monitor encapsulates data along with a set of access functions which support single 
thread access to  a data item. Critical sections are identified with the keyword 
synchronized and thread (delactivation is controlled by wait and notify commands. 
An implementation of the specification of the Alternating Bit Protocol pre- 
sented in sectlion I11 follows. 
class Receive 
{ 
private itein data; 
private int ackno, WaitAck = 1, LastSent = 0;  
private boolean progress = false; 
public synchronized void Acceptjiterri data) { 
while (LastSent == WaitAck && progress == false) 
wait () ; 
LastSent = (LastSent + 1) MOD 2; 
Forward(LastSent, data); 
while (progress == false); 
progress = false; 
while (LastSent == WaitAck) ( 
Forward(LastSerit,, data) ; 
while (progress == false); 
progress = false; 
1 
1 
protected synchronized void Reply(int ackno) { 
if (ackno == WaitAck) { 
WaitAck = (IVaitAck + 1) MOD 2; 




progress = true; 
class Send { 
private i t em info; 
private int  messno, NextRequired = 1; 
protected void Forward(int messno, i t em info) { 
if (messno == NextRequired) { 
Write(inf0) ; 
NextRequired = (NextRequired + 1) MOD 2; 
1; 
Reply((NextRequired - 1) MOD 2); 
1; 
1; 
The class Receive includes the suspension of the execution of the method Accept 
when a new data item is received but notification by the class object Send confirms 
that the previous data item forwarded to Send has been corrupted. The current 
data item must be repeatedly forwarded to  Send until notification by Send confirms 
that the data itern has been received. At this time, any one of the suspended 
threads of execution can be resumed. 
To prove this Java implementation satisfies the specification of the Alternating 
Bit Prot,ocol presented in section 111, one must verify that  the postcondition of each 
call and of each method called defines a process trace for the class that  satisfies 
the corresponding row of the class7 specification table. A full set of axioms and 
rules of inference for monitors are provided in [28] in order to  perform this task; 
however, highlights of this process follow. 
A process trace will be associated with each declared object of a class; for 
this example, hRec and h ~ ~ , ~ ~ .  The elements comprising the process trace sequence 
hSend are very similar to  those listed in the specification table for the process Send 
when including the information omitted when preserving table space. The major 
difference is in the elements representing either a call t o  a method or that a method 
is called. Instead of using a one action element, two trace elements are used to  
record the call being made and the subsequent return from the method called as 
well as the start and end of the execution of a method. 
On the other hand, the elements included in the process trace sequence hRec 
include several new trace elements, two of which are the new elements listed for 
hSend. Two more elements will be introduced to represent the suspensions and 
resumptions of the threads of execution which occur due t o  tlie wait and notify 
commands. Therefore, the execution of a wait command causes the addition of 
a suspensioll element to the class object trace sequence hRe, and the execution of 
a notify command causes the addittion of a resume element. These new elements 
contain additional information due to  the need to introduce incarnation numbers 
which represent particular incarnations of tjhe method Accept [28]. 
For the method Forward in the class object S e n d ,  the postcondition is as follows: 
Postcondition { h>,,,(I) = (!Forward) A h;.,,,(2) = (?Reply) A 
hrSend(3) = (!Reply,NextRequired - I Mod 2) A 
A NextRequired = messno + 
{NextRequired = NextRequired + 1 Mod 2 A 
hkend(4) = (?Write) A hkend(5) = (!Write,info) A 
/1;,,,(6) = (?Forward,messno, in f 0 ) )  
A NextRequired # messno + 
{h>end(3) = ( !Reply ,Ne~~tRe~uiTed - I Mod 2) A 
h2.,,,(4) = (?Forward,messno, i n  f 0)) ) 
After making the stlbstitution of the specification variable names with the corre- 
sponding implementation variable names, removing from hRec those elements which 
were added for the purpose of applying the verification mode1 tto this implementa- 
tion, and transforming the postcondition of the method Forward into an invariant 
for the class object Send, will allow this invariant tto satisfy the specification table 
in section 111. 
For the method Reply defined in the class object Receive: 
Postcondit ion { h&,,(l) = (!Reply) A {ackno # WaitAc t  + 
hh,,(2) = (?Reply,ackno)) A { ackno = WaitAck  3 
{WuitAck: = WaitAck  + 1 Mod 2 A 
hh,,(2) = {?Resume)) ) A progress = true ) 
For the method Accept defined in the class object Receive: 
Postcondition { kk, , ( l )  = ( !Accept)  A progress = false  A 
3k. {Vj.  2 5 j 5 2 * k .  [ Even ( j )  A (LastSent  + lMod2 = Wai tAck )  =s 
h g , ( j )  = (?Forward) A 
hk,,(j + 1 )  = (!Forward,LusCSent, data) ] A 
h&,,(2 * k + 2 )  = (?Forward) A 
hkec(2 * k + 3) = (!Forward,LastSent, data) 
[LastSent # WaitAck  + hhe,(2 * k + 4 )  = (?Accept,data)] A 
[LastSent = WaitAck  + hh,,(2 * k + 4 )  = (!Suspend) A 
h&,,(2 * k + 5 )  = ('?Accept,data)] )) 
Combining the postconditions of the two methods and handling the multiple 
in~arnat~ions of the method Accept make the determination of the class object 
invariant for Receive difficult. The construction of the invariant requires the appli- 
cat8ion of several proof rules found in [28] which are not presented here. However, 
the pattern of sequence elements imposed by both the Accept and Reply method 
is consistent with the specification table for Receive. 
The individual class object invariants will be combined with a compatibility 
requirement on the class object trace sequences to ensure that any action in which 
two objects participate is recorded on the two trace sequences in a mutually con- 
sistent fashion. The definition of C m p a t ( h l , .  . . , h,) is as follows. 
Therefore, the values for those elements recorded in the trace sequence hR,, 
when issuing a call to  the method Forward will indeed be recorded in the trace 
sequence elements for receiving the method call in hSend. The proposed two se- 
quences of data items, .r and s, can be constructed from the ?Accept elements of hRec 
and from the !Write elements of hSend to ensure that this implementation satisfies 
the protocol requirement, .r & s. 
5. Comparison to Related Works 
Trace-based semantics for networks are based on either individual channel or 
process traces. The majority of these proof systems are of the channel trace va- 
riety and unfortunately suffer from being incomplete [14]. In order Lo overcome 
incompleteness, some authors have resorted to abandoning first-order logic in favor 
of temporal logic [31]. The process trace-based model presented here is (relatively) 
complete [ 5 ] ,  relies only on first-order logic, and is modular [26]. It has been ap- 
plied to all forms of concurrency and in a production-quality, large-scale software 
development system [27]. This process trace semantic model is a full abstraction 
of the operational model (contains sufficient information t o  prove essential proper- 
ties of the model without containing too much information, e.g. the internals of a 
process). 
Lamport[l5,16] introduces specifications which consist of a collection of state 
funct,ions that  map program states into sets of values; a collection of initial values 
for these functions which define the set of states in which the system may begin 
computation; and a collection of properties, written using temporal logic, describ- 
ing both the safety and liveness conditions required of the system. Lamport's 
specification model significantly differs fi-om the proposed specification model in 
that  only externally visible behavior of the concurrent program is specified. An- 
other major departure lies in the use of control predicates and prograrn counters 
in the specification of a process. Conversely, the proposed specification model cap- 
tures a process' behavior a t  a higher level of abstraction. In the proposed model, 
a process can be viewed as an abstract data object where t8he externally visible 
actions change the value (i.e. state) of the object. Therefore, the specification of a 
process defines the ~emant~ics of this abstract data object without including infor- 
mation concerning its implementation. In order to verify a process, Lamport must 
introduce auxiliary state functions and use temporal logic whereas in the proposed 
model the corresponding verification method in [26] can be directly applied to  the 
original specifications. 
Leveson9s AND/OR Tables [91] are a tabular representation of the disjunc- 
tive nor~nal  form of a Boolean expression. Specifications are written in RSML, 
Requirements State Machine Language, which uses state transitions to capture 
the functional behavior of the software. Transition conditions are translated into 
AND/OR tables. Functions were chosen to  guarantee completeness and consistency 
and tools are provided to  support this analysis. However, trhis choice forces spec- 
ifications t o  be deterministic. AND/OR tables can become difficult t o  use when 
transition conditions are written using such first-order logic operators as implica- 
tion and equivalence. Lastly, the application of this specification model, as well as 
the remaining specification models in this section, focuses only on the requirements 
specification stage of the software life-cycle. 
Parnas proposes the use of tabular representations of relatioils [20,21] for cre- 
ating program specifications which describe a set of statte sequences in a finite state 
machine. A variety of table formats are used to  define the mathematical functions 
and relat,ions that  capture the state transitions of the software system. The table 
format is proport,ed t,o aid in the understanding of multidimensional expressions 
and simplify the inspection of requirements specification documents. Numerous 
rules are provided for changing table formats in order to  provide the most read- 
able function definition. The main emphasis for providing a tabular notation is to  
support the construction of readable systems requirements documents. 
The SCR, Software Cost Reduction, method [12] describes the functional re- 
quirements of software and is applied during the requirements specification of a 
software system. This method includes Parnas' tabular representations to describe 
system functions, timing, and precision; however, the SCR method attempts t o  
provide a formal basis through the use of a (deterministic) state automaton, mon- 
itored and controlled variables, conditions, and events. Table functions are used 
to define output variables, terms, and mode classes for condition, event, and mode 
transition tables. Tools are available for consistency and completeness checks. The 
main application of this method is to embedded process control systems. 
6 .  Summary 
A formal method is proposed that  meets many of the needs and desires of the 
industrial community: the method can be a,pplied throughout the software life- 
cycle, has been used during industrial software development, and uses a notation 
that  amppeals to engineers. The specification model proposed records the external 
behavior of a process in a tabular manner using process trace sequences which 
record the externally visible actions of this process. Using this model, the specifi- 
cation of the externally visible behavior of each concurrent program captures the 
program's behavior wit,hout examining the internal structure of the individual pro- 
cesses. The modular proof systems presented in [26] can be used to verify that a 
particular implementation meets its specification and current tools exist to  support 
this acti~it~y. 
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